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Folk Biology
Folk biology is the cognitive study of how people classify
and reason about the organic world. Humans everywhere
classify animals and plants into species-like groups as obvi-
ous to a modern scientist as to a Maya Indian. Such groups
are primary loci for thinking about biological causes and
relations (Mayr 1969). Historically, they provided a transthe-
oretical base for scientific biology in that different theories—
including evolutionary theory—have sought to account for
the apparent constancy of “common species” and the organic
processes centering on them. In addition, these preferred
groups have “from the most remote period . . . been classed in
groups under groups” (Darwin 1859: 431). This taxonomic
array provides a natural framework for inference, and an
inductive compedium of information, about organic catego-
ries and properties. It is not as conventional or arbitrary in
structure and content, nor as variable across cultures, as the
assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials, or social
groups. From the vantage of EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY,
such natural systems are arguably routine “habits of mind,”
in part a natural selection for grasping relevant and recurrent
“habits of the world.”
The relative contributions of mind and world to folk biol-
ogy are current research topics in COGNITIVE ANTHROPOL-
OGY and COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (Medin and Atran
1998). Ethnobiology is the anthropological study of folk
biology; a research focus is folk taxonomy, which describes
the hierarchical structure, organic content, and cultural
function of folk biological classifications the world over.
Naive biology is the psychological study of folk biology in
industrialized societies; a research focus is category-based
induction, which concerns how children and adults learn
about, and reason from, biological categories.
Ethnobiology roughly divides into adherents of cultural
universals versus CULTURAL RELATIVISM (debated also as
“intellectualism” versus “utilitarianism,” Brown 1995).
Universalists highlight folk taxonomic principles that are
only marginally influenced by people’s needs and uses to
which taxonomies are put (Berlin 1992). Relativists empha-
size those structures and contents of folk biological catego-
ries that are fashioned by cultural interest, experience, and
use (Ellen 1993). Universalists grant that even within a cul-
ture there may be different special-purpose classifications
(beneficial/noxious, domestic/wild, edible/inedible, etc.).
However, there is only one cross-culturally universal kind of
general-purpose taxonomy, which supports the widest pos-
sible range of inductions about living kinds. This distinction
between special- and general-purpose folk biological classi-
fications parallels the distinction in philosophy of science
between artificial versus natural classification (Gilmour and
Walters 1964).
A culture’s general-purpose folk taxonomy is composed
of a stable hierarchy of inclusive groups of organisms, or
taxa, which are mutually exclusive at each level of the hier-
archy. These absolutely distinct levels, or ranks, are: folk
kingdom (e.g., animal, plant), life form (e.g., bug, fish, bird,
mammal/animal, tree, herb/grass, bush), generic species
(gnat, shark, robin, dog, oak, clover, holly), folk specific
(poodle, white oak), and folk varietal (toy poodle; swamp
white oak). Ranking is a cognitive mapping that projects liv-
ing kind categories onto fundamentally different levels of
reality. Ranks, not taxa, are universal. Taxa of the same rank
tend to display similar linguistic, psychological, and biolog-
ical characteristics. For example, most generic species are
labeled by short, simple words (i.e., unanalyzable lexical
stems: “oak,” “dog”). In contrast, subordinate specifics are
usually labelled binomially (i.e., attributive + lexical stem:
“white oak”) unless culturally very salient (in which case
they may also merit simple words: “poodle,” “collie”). Rel-
ativists agree there is a preferred taxonomic level roughly
corresponding to that of the scientific species (e.g., dog) or
genus (e.g., oak). Phenomenally salient species for humans,
including most species of large vertebrates and trees, belong
to monospecific genera in any given locale, hence the term
“generic species” for this preferred taxonomic level (also
called “folk generic” or “specieme”). Nevertheless, relativ-
ists note that even in seemingly general-purpose taxono-
mies, categories superordinate or subordinate to generic
species can reflect “special-purpose” distinctions of cultural
practice and expertise. For example, the Kalam of New
Guinea deny that cassowaries fall under the bird life form,
not only because flightless cassowaries are physically
unlike other birds, but also because they are ritually prized
objects of the hunt (Bulmer 1967).
Universalism in folk biology may be further subdivided
into tendencies that parallel philosophical and psychologi-
cal distinctions between RATIONALISM VS EMPIRICISM (Malt
1995). Empiricists claim that universal structures of folk
taxonomy owe primarily to perceived structures of “objec-
tive discontinuities” in nature rather than to the mind’s con-
ceptual structure. On this view, the mind/brain merely
provides domain-general mechanisms for assessing percep-
tual similarities, which are recursively applied to produce
the embedded similarity-structures represented in folk tax-
onomy (Hunn 1976). Rationalists contend that higher-order
cognitive principles are needed to produce regularities in
folk biological structures (Atran 1990). For example, one
pair of principles is that every object is either an animal or
plant or neither, and that no animal or plant can fail to
belong uniquely to a generic species. Thus, the rank of folk
kingdom—the level of plant and animal—is a category of
people’s intuitive ontology, and conceiving an object as
plant or animal entails notions about generic species that are
not applied to objects thought to belong to other ontological
categories, such as person, substance, or artifact. Although
such principles may be be culturally universal, cognitively
compelling, and adaptive for everyday life, they no longer
neatly accord with the known scientific structure of the
organic world.
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In the study of naive biology, disagreement arises over
whether higher-order principles evince strong or weak
NATIVISM; that is, whether they reflect the innate modularity
and DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY of folk biology (Inagaki and
Hatano 1996), or are learned on the basis of cognitive prin-
ciples inherent to other domains, such as NAIVE PHYSICS or
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY (Carey 1995). One candidate for a
domain-specific principle involves a particular sort of
ESSENTIALISM, which carries an invariable presumption that
the various members of each generic species share a unique
underlying nature, or biological essence. Such an essence
may be considered domain-specific insofar as it is an intrin-
sic (i.e., nonartifactual) teleological agent, which physically
(i.e., nonintentionally) causes the biologically relevant parts
and properties of a generic species to function and cohere
“for the sake of” the generic species itself. Thus, American
preschoolers consistently judge that thorns on a rose bush
exist for the sake of there being more roses, whereas physi-
cally similar depictions of barbs on barbed wire or the pro-
tuberances of a jagged rock do not elicit indications of
inherent purpose and design (Keil 1994). People everywere
expect the disparate properties of a generic species to be
integrated without having to know the precise causal chains
linking universally recognized relationships of morpho-
behavioral functioning, inheritance and reproduction, dis-
ease and death.
This essentialist concept shares features with the broader
philosophical notion NATURAL KIND in regard to category-
based induction. Thus, on learning that one cow is suscepti-
ble to “mad cow” disease, one might reasonably infer that
all cows, but not all mammals or animals, are susceptible to
the disease. This is presumably because disease is related to
“deep” biological properties, and because cow is a generic
species with a fairly uniform distribution of such properties.
The taxonomic arrangement of generic species systemati-
cally extends this inductive power: it is more “natural” to
infer a greater probability that all mammals share the dis-
ease than that all animals do. Taxonomic stability allows
formulation of a general principle of biological induction: a
property found in two organisms is most likely found in all
organisms belonging to the lowest-ranked taxon containing
the two. This powerful inferential principle also underlies
systematics, the scientific classification of organic life (War-
burton 1967). Still, relativists can point to cultural and his-
torical influences on superordinate and subordinate taxa as
suggesting that biologically relevant properties can be
weighted differently for induction in different traditions.
See also CONCEPT; COLOR CLASSIFICATION; NAIVE SOCI-
OLOGY
—Scott Atran
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Folk Psychology
In recent years, folk psychology has become a topic of
debate not just among philosophers, but among develop-
mental psychologists and primatologists as well. Yet there
are two different things that “folk psychology” has come to
mean, and they are not always distinguished: (1) common-
sense psychology that explains human behavior in terms of
beliefs, desires, intentions, expectations, preferences, hopes,
fears, and so on; (2) an interpretation of such everyday
explanations as part of a folk theory, comprising a network
of generalizations employing concepts like belief, desire,
and so on. The second definition—suggested by Sellars
(1963) and dubbed “theory-theory” by Morton (1980)— is a
philosophical account of the first.
Folk psychology (1) concerns the conceptual framework
of explanations of human behavior: If the explanatory
framework of folk psychology (1) is correct, then “because
Nan wants the baby to sleep,” which employs the concept of
wanting, may be a good (partial) explanation of Nan’s turn-
ing the TV off. Folk psychology (2) concerns how folk-
psychological-(1) explanations are to be interpreted: If folk
psychology (2) is correct, then “because Nan wants the baby
to sleep” is an hypothesis that Nan had an internal (brain)
state of wanting the baby to sleep and that state caused Nan
to turn the TV off.
Although the expression folk psychology came to promi-
nence as a term for theory-theory, that is, folk psychology
(2), it is now used more generally to refer to commonsense
psychology, that is, folk psychology (1). This largely unno-
ticed broadening of the term has made for confusion in the
literature. Folk psychology (in one or the other sense, or
sometimes equivocally) has been the focus of two debates.
